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A Failure to Supervise:
How the Bureaucracy and the
Courts Abandoned Their Intended
Roles under ERISA
Lauren R. Roth*
I.

Introduction

In 1922, Roscoe Pound wrote that “[w]ealth in a
commercial age is made up largely of promises.”1 The primary
purpose of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”) was to ensure that employers honored their
promises to pay pension benefits to employees.2 Congress had
to protect employees, however, without discouraging employers
from voluntarily providing pension plans.3 As part of that
balancing act, Congress decided to delegate substantial
responsibility for administering ERISA to employers whose
fiduciary role mandates that they protect employees who
participate in ERISA plans (“participants”) and their
beneficiaries.4

* Copyright © 2014. Acting Assistant Professor, New York University
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J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., The George Washington University. I thank
Ira Katznelson, Robert Lieberman, Michael Ting, and James Wooten for their
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Sciences and the Department of Political Science.
1. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 236
(1922), cited in John H. Langbein, Rise of the Management Trust, TR. &
ESTATES 53 (2004).
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 2, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (2012); ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2012).
3. Pension and Welfare Plans: Hearing on S. 3421, S. 1024, S. 1103 and
S. 1255 Before S. Subcomm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 90th CONG. 122
(1968) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits).
4. See ERISA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2012).
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ERISA permits executives and agents of the employer to
serve as fiduciaries5 but includes a broad definition of fiduciary
to ensure that they act in the best interests of participants and
beneficiaries instead of the employer. Anyone who has
discretion to manage the plan or its assets or “has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan” is a fiduciary and subject to
ERISA’s enforcement provisions.6
New York Senator, Republican Jacob Javits, was a longtime proponent of pension reform. With respect to enforcement,
Javits wrote:
I think a single agency is required for the
purpose and it will be a very difficult task to
regulate the operation of the employee benefit

5. ERISA § 408, 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c) (2012) (“Nothing in section 1106 of
this title shall be construed to prohibit any fiduciary from. . . (3) serving as a
fiduciary in addition to being an officer, employee, agent, or other
representative of a party in interest.”).
6. Id. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012). As the
conference committee explained:
Under this definition, fiduciaries include officers and
directors of a plan, members of a plan’s investment
committee and persons who select these individuals.
Consequently, the definition includes persons who have
authority and responsibility with respect to the matter in
question, regardless of their formal title. The term
‘fiduciary’ also includes any person who renders investment
advice for a fee and includes persons to whom ‘discretionary’
duties have been delegated by named fiduciaries.
While the ordinary functions of consultants and advisers to
employee benefit plans (other than investment advisers)
may not be considered as fiduciary functions, it must be
recognized that there will be situations where such
consultants and advisers may because of their special
expertise, in effect, be exercising discretionary authority or
control with respect to the management or administration of
such plan or some authority or control regarding its assets.
In such cases, they are to be regarded as having assumed
fiduciary obligations within the meaning of the applicable
definition.
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 64-65 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).
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plans
sufficiently
to
assure
legitimate
expectations of employee participation while
avoiding undue and unnecessary interference in
the operation of these plans. Overregulation or
unnecessary regulation would be worse than
none for it would deter the installation and
improvement of these much-needed programs.
We have to steer between frustrated expectations
for pension plan members growing out of no
regulation
and
frustrations
caused
by
overregulation which will deter the employer
from instituting a pension plan.7
Despite the consensus among most pension reform
advocates that a single bureaucratic agency was preferable to
fragmented bureaucratic jurisdiction, Congress (for the reasons
discussed below) placed principal responsibility for enforcing
the statute with two existing bureaucratic agencies rather than
creating a single agency to regulate pensions and adjudicate
disputes.8
The decision to rely on two agencies to enforce the statute
paved the way for the federal courts to develop pension policy
because Congress depended in part upon a private litigation
remedy instead of placing the adjudicative function within the
bureaucracy.9 That remedy placed a heavy burden on plan
participants to initiate and litigate their claims in federal
court.10
Congress intended for courts to enforce ERISA’s primary
mission of safeguarding pension promises.11 As was the case

7. Pension and Welfare Plans: Hearing on S. 3421, S. 1024, S. 1103 and
S. 1255 Before S. Subcomm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 90th CONG. 122
(1968) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits).
8. As discussed further below, participants and beneficiaries were
authorized under ERISA to file lawsuits to enforce their rights under the
statute, and the courts have sole adjudicative power under ERISA to resolve
disputes between plan administrators and participants and beneficiaries.
9. Private Pension Plan Reform Part II: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Private Pension Plans of the Comm. Fin., 93d CONG. 222 (1974) (statement of
Frank Cummings) [hereinafter “Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II”].
10. See id.
11. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2012).
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before ERISA (when plan participants relied on trust theories
and breach of contract to seek redress in court), however, the
courts gave sustained deference to the decisions made by
employer representatives.12 Faced with fiduciaries who had
more experience and expertise in the administration of benefit
plans and their own conflicting objective of judicial efficiency,
courts abdicated the role Congress intended for them to play in
the regulation of private pensions after ERISA and expanded
the delegation of authority to fiduciaries.13 This left fiduciaries
the power to decide all benefit claims essentially without
supervision by an outside, disinterested party. And it left
participants with little more protection than they had prior to
ERISA.
Section II of this Article addresses how courts failed to
adequately supervise employers administering pension plans
before ERISA. Relying on a number of different legal theories—
from an initial theory that pensions were gratuities offered by
employers to the recognition that pension promises could create
contractual rights—the courts repeatedly found ways to allow
employers to promise much and provide little to workers
expecting retirement security. In Section III, this Article
addresses how Congress failed to create an effective structure
for strong bureaucratic enforcement and the bureaucratic
agencies with enforcement responsibilities failed to fulfill those
functions. Finally, in Section IV, this Article discusses how the
courts abdicated their duty to supervise ERISA fiduciaries once
bureaucratic failings made ERISA’s private litigation remedy
and the supervisory function of the courts increasingly
important.
As the government expands its role in regulating the
provision of healthcare while maintaining employer
involvement, an examination of the balance between employer
control and worker rights under ERISA should inform
implementation and enforcement of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. While legislative battles over healthcare
have dominated the news, this Article serves as a reminder
12. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1564
n. 7 (11th Cir. 1990).
13. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the
Bureaucracy, and the Delegation Dilemma, 22 REG. 30, 37 (1999).
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that the execution of laws can undo congressional bargains.
II. Pension Lawsuits Prior to ERISA
Prior to ERISA, employees faced many obstacles when
challenging the pension decisions of employers in the courts.
Consider the testimony of Frank Cummings, Chief of Staff to
Senator Javits during the passage of ERISA, before the Senate
Finance Committee on June 4, 1973 regarding the problems
faced by a participant seeking to litigate against a pension
plan.14
Cummings started his discussion at the point when a
hypothetical participant tells a potential lawyer that “they owe
him a pension” or “they are misusing the money in the pension
fund.”15 The first of several problems facing the lawyer was to
figure out who “they” are—what corporate entity employs the
participant, who are the trustees, which bank holds the money,
which insurance company (perhaps) funds the plan, and which
unions and officers are involved.16
The next question is what jurisdiction’s law to apply and
whether a single court has jurisdiction over all of the relevant
parties.17 The individuals and entities that make up the less
than cohesive “they” in question may be located in several
different states, and the plan documents may not have a choice
of law provision.18
The final—and most substantive question—is what legal
claim the participant will assert and whether participants and
their lawyers will have an adequate incentive to litigate.19 If
the lawyer argues misuse of funds by the plan, the recovery
will go to the pension fund and not the individual plaintiff.20
The plaintiff gets nothing except a more well-funded pension
14. Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9 (statement of
Frank Cummings).
15. Id. at 221.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9, at 221
(statement of Frank Cummings).
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fund.21 If the plaintiff sues to recover his pension, the value of
the lawsuit is the net present value of one pension.22 In either
case, the benefit recovered, if any, will likely be too small to
motivate most lawyers to tackle the complexities of pension
law.23 Only in the event of a class action lawsuit, which is
typically organized and financed by a larger entity (such as a
union), does the potential recovery justify the costs and
uncertainties of litigation for prospective lawyers.24
With great foresight, Cummings concluded:
In short, private lawsuits, under existing law, do
not provide a meaningful remedy for the
employee in most pension cases. What is needed
is a national law, with a national agency to
enforce it, which will get this whole matter out of
the area of ordinary, garden variety, litigation,
which simply does not work.25
As Cummings made clear, private litigation remedies did
not sufficiently protect employees prior to ERISA.
A. Pension Promises as Gratuities
Beginning in the late nineteenth century and lasting until
the middle of the twentieth century, courts viewed pensions as
gratuities (i.e., gifts) to be altered or withdrawn freely by
employers.26 Plan documents for pensions also limited an

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 222. “You can’t sue for a pension today. Even if the plan owes
it to you, you can’t sue unless someone is backing you or unless you have a
class action. The legal fee for the first day of the lawsuit would exceed the
amount of recovery.” Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9, at 13
(statement of Frank Cummings).
26. The gratuity theory was followed in cases until the 1950s. JOHN H.
LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 134 (4th ed. 2006)
(“Because the plan authorized the employer to revoke promised pension
benefits at will, those promises were treated like a promise to make a gift in
the future, which is unenforceable until the gift is actually completed. (Notice

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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employer’s legal liability to employees, and courts found that
offering pensions to employees created no judiciable rights.27
For example, in McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., the plaintiff
sued to recover $52.54 from a pension fund established by his
employer. 28 The court found that the amount credited to his
“account” under the plan by his employer was a gift completed
only upon “actual payment” and that the employee had no
vested right to the money until payment.29 In the governing
documents, the employer had reserved the right to determine
whether its employees were entitled to the “gift”, and the court
refused to review that decision:
It seems to me that the scheme by which this
fund is created is simply a promise on the part of
the defendant to give to its employees a certain
sum in the future, with an absolute reservation
that it may at any time determine not to
complete the gift, and if it does so determine, an
employee has no right of action to recover the
sum standing to his credit on the books of the
pension fund.30
the similarity to the common law doctrine of employment at will.)”).
27. Timothy J. Heinsz, A Reappraisal of the Private Pension System, 57
CORNELL L. REV. 278, 282 (1972); see Norman Stein, Raiders of the Corporate
Pension Plan: The Reversion of Excess Plan Assets to the Employer, 5 AM. J.
TAX POL’Y 117, 138 (1986) (stating the majority rule for early pension
promises was that they were “more akin to charity than to earned wages” and
reviewing a few representative cases and relevant treatises).
28. McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98, 98 (N.Y. App. Div.
1898).
29. Id. at 99-100.
30. Id. at 100; see, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790-91 (8th
Cir. 1944) (“The company was within its rights in providing that the pensions
awarded under the plan were gratuities . . . By the rules and regulations
promulgated by the company and administered by the Board of Pensions [an
entity set up and controlled by the employer], the company only obligated
itself to pension such employees as the Board of Pensions, in the fair exercise
of the power conferred upon it, determined to be eligible to receive the
benefits of the plan.”); Fickling v. Pollard, 179 S.E. 582, 583 (Ga. Ct. App.
1935) (Although the plaintiff argued the existence of an implied contract, the
cessation of his disability pension payments was not actionable because the
payments “amounted to no more than a gratuitous arrangement by the
company for the payment, at its option, of pensions to old employees . . . [and]
was ‘expressly’ made subject to denial, suspension, or permanent
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Courts that denied participants their pensions emphasized
the voluntary, non-contributory (i.e., entirely employer funded)
nature of the plans.31 The gratuitous nature of these plans and
the reservations of the employer’s right to amend or cancel the
terms at any time meant that employees’ and retirees’ pension
benefits never vested.32 Even in cases where the employer and
the court acknowledged that the employer’s pension promises
benefited the employer through improved employee morale and
increased tenure based on the promise of a pension, courts
refused to find that pension promises constituted a binding
contract.33 Some courts still denied claims even when
discontinuance by the company at any time.”).
31. See Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int’l Union, 307 F.2d
671, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (“Here, the Pension Plan voluntarily established by
the appellee Union required no contribution from Neuffer or any other
participant, and none was made. The Union could properly prescribe, as it
did here, conditions on payment of pension benefits reasonably related to the
Union’s welfare.”); Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 117 N.E.2d 880,
882 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954) (“These provisions say that the defendant is paying
the entire cost of the plan; that the payments are voluntary; that no
contractual relationship is intended or created between the defendant and its
employees.”); Umshler v. Umshler, 76 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947)
(“The uncontroverted evidence shows that the pension plan of defendant
railroad company is wholly voluntary. All the benefits are paid out of the
corporate treasury. No pension fund is provided, nor were any contributions
required of or made by defendant Umshler or any other employee and, so far
as the record shows, all the expense of the administration of the plan is borne
by defendant railroad company.”).
32. See Kravitz v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 160 N.Y.S.2d 716,
719 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957) (“The donor of a gift has the right to fix the terms
and the objects of his bounty. The terms of the Retirement Plan give no
vested rights to others than those specifically provided for. . . . The most that
may be said for plaintiffs is that each enjoyed an inchoate gift. This never
ripened into a vested one.”); Dolan v. Heller Bros., 104 A.2d 860, 861 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1954) (“[I]t seems well settled in other jurisdictions that a
pension plan which is purely voluntary on the part of the employer and to
which the employee makes no contribution, is not an enforceable contract,
but a mere gratuity, in which the employee has no vested right until he
begins to receive benefits thereunder.”).
33. See Hughes, 117 N.E.2d at 882.
Defendant concedes that an employer receives a benefit
from instituting a pension plan by way of increased stability
of employment and in the greater security and contentment
of its employees and that it is largely for this reason it
instituted and presently maintains such a program. It does
not follow, however, that where a pension plan is placed into

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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recognizing that pension promises were a form of deferred
compensation. As the New York Court of Appeals stated when
denying former employees access to funds set aside in a
retirement and profit sharing plan:
There were some references in the testimony
that a portion of the funds would otherwise have
been distributed as bonuses, and in that sense
the members were contributors. However,
bonuses were gratuities which might or might
not be distributed at the pleasure of the Board of
Directors of the Company. It cannot be gainsaid,
we think, that the benefits conferred on the
Members of the Plan were tantamount to gifts,
and the Company had the right, as the donor, to
fix the terms and limitations of the gifts.34
As a federal appeals court noted in denying pension
benefits: “No statute then in force required of the company the
assumption of the burden which it took upon itself in providing
for pensions for its employees. It therefore had the right . . . to
condition its bounty in such manner as it saw fit.”35 While
pension law subsequently advanced beyond viewing pension
promises as gratuities, the voluntary nature of our private
effect the employee thereby acquires a vested right to have
the plan kept in effect.
Id.
34. Fernekes v. CMP Indus., Inc., 195 N.E.2d 884, 887 (N.Y. 1963). But
cf. Schofield v. Zion’s Co-Op. Mercantile Inst., 39 P.2d 342 (Utah 1934). In
Schofield, the court found that a contract did exist providing the retirees with
a vested pension that could not be reduced. The terms of the pension plan
stated that the purpose of the plan was to “encourage long and faithful
service” and that after such service an employee would be entitled to a
pension in the amount stated in the plan. Id. at 344-45. The court held that
the pension acted as an inducement for the plaintiffs to continue their
employment, and after their long service and the determination that they had
met the terms required for the pension, no modification of the contract was
possible by the employer. Id. at 345. The lack of equivocation and plan
language carefully stating that the pension promised was a gift that could be
modified or withdrawn at any point distinguishes this case from the bulk of
pension claims during this era, however.
35. Menke, 140 F.2d at 790.
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pension system remains.
B. Pension Promises as Contracts
Although in the decades prior to ERISA’s enactment most
courts ruled that pension promises were contracts and not
gratuities,36 “employees fair[ed] no better under this theory
than they did under the gratuity theory.”37 Most judges
believed that they had no choice but to favor employers and
strictly construe the terms of the pension plans that they
drafted.38
Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int’l Union,
highlights the evolution of pension jurisprudence from viewing
pensions as gratuities to contracts. 39 The district court initially
approved the defendant union’s actions forfeiting a retiree’s
pension and terminating payments.40 It held that there were
“none of the essential elements of a contract” and it would not
construe the terms of a “voluntary non-contributory plan
strictly against an employer.”41 Since the employer reserved its
rights to modify the plan and to determine eligibility and

36. See Heinz v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce of St. Louis, 237 F. 942, 949-50
(8th Cir. 1916), for an early example of the recognition of contractual rights
to a pension.
37. Heinsz, supra note 27, at 284; see Stein, supra note 27, at 138-39
(finding trend in case law towards recognition of unilateral contract rights
through pension plans by the 1930s and stating that “some courts, faced with
the argument that employees who were promised pensions just might have
given some consideration—namely, their labor—found more satisfactory legal
doctrines to deny many dissatisfied employees their pensions most of the
time”). One dissenting judge protested a circuit court decision upholding an
employer’s termination of a retiree’s pension, writing, “I am unwilling to
endorse the employer’s brutal treatment of a pensioner who served it for most
of his mature life. We open ourselves to the charge that judicial concern for
individual rights in this jurisdiction is confined arbitrarily and capriciously to
criminal cases.” Neuffer, 307 F.2d at 676 (Burger, J., dissenting).
38. See Wallace v. N. Ohio Traction & Light Co., 13 N.E. 2d 139, 143
(Ohio Ct. App. 1937) (“To hold otherwise, is to become involved in a
discussion of purely ethical questions with no pertinent rule of law or related
principle in equity to form a standard for our conclusion.”).
39. Neuffer, 307 F.2d at 671.
40. Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int’l Union, 193 F.Supp.
699, 700 (D.D.C. 1961).
41. Id.
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forfeiture under the terms of the plan, the union was within its
rights to suspend payments.42 The appellate court, while still
siding with the employer, found that the terms of the pension
plan did create a valid contract between the employee and the
union.43 Any vested rights created by the plan were subject to
reasonable conditions placed on the continued receipt of a
pension, however, and the court “nevertheless enforces
reasonable contracts.”44 The strongly worded dissent, on the
other hand, affirms that a pension is now considered a
contractual form of deferred compensation and not a gratuity
but disagrees with the result reached by the majority.45 Since
the employer drafted the contract, it should have been strictly
construed against the union.46
Under the “unilateral contract theory,” a pension contract
was created when the employer offered a pension plan and the
employee accepted employment or remained on the job based in
part on that pension—relying on the promise of a future
pension and presumably accepting some decrease in current
wages.47 To qualify for a pension, the employee had to satisfy

42. Id.
43. Neuffer, 307 F.2d at 673.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 674 (Burger, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 674-75 (Burger, J., dissenting).
47. See Heinsz, supra note 27, at 283-85; Stein, supra note 27, at 138-40;
see also In re Schenectady R.R., 93 F. Supp. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 1950) (holding
that promised pensions were a part of the consideration for employees’ labor
under the collective bargaining agreement and that, like wages, vacation pay,
and other benefits, pensions were “a part of the reward for his effort”);
Hunter v. Sparling, 197 P.2d 807, 814 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (“[W]here the
employer has a pension plan and the employee knows of it, continued
employment constitutes consideration for the promise to pay the pension. The
pension is considered to be deferred compensation.”); Gearns v. Commercial
Cable Co., 32 N.Y.S.2d 856, 858 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1942) (denying plaintiff’s
pension claims on other grounds but confirming that “it is doubtful if
defendant arbitrarily could have refused payment as the plan was not merely
a benefaction but a contract supported by plaintiff’s consideration of
continued services under the plan and his acceptance of other obligations
under it.”). Compare Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 11 N.E.2d 878, 880
(Ohio Ct. App. 1937) (“During these years [the employee] was led to believe
that 2 per cent of his earnings would be paid him when the company
considered him more favorably in the position of a pensioner than as an
employee receiving a full salary or wage. The appellant has made its election.
It has concluded that he has reached the point of industrial old age. . . . He,
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the terms set forth in the pension plan’s governing
documents—none of which he had any say in—and then had to
hope he was not laid off from his job and that the employer
remained financially sound.48
In Texas N. O. R. Co. v. Jones, for example, a Texas
appellate court found that the defendant employer could not
terminate the plaintiff’s pension because he had been
committed to a state-run mental facility.49 Quoting the trial
court decision, the appellate court found:
That the offer made under said pension system
was an inducement to the company’s employees
to remain in its service and render to it the long
continued faithful service, giving their entire
time to its service, as required, in order to reap
the benefits offered under said pension system,
and that the rendering of the long continued
faithful service of its employees as required by it,
was a benefit to the railroad company, and that
however, cannot be in good faith and justice denied the alternative held out
by the employer as an inducement, for more than a quarter of a century, to
continue service with the appellant.”) and Wilson v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co.,
194 N.E. 441 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934) (refusing to allow the company to avoid its
contractual pension obligation by firing an employee arbitrarily at age 65
because its pension promises were “a daily inducement to continuation of
service and to exertion to satisfy”), with Bos v. U.S. Rubber Co., 224 P.2d 386
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that his discharge at age
60 violated his pension contract because he had no right to retire under the
plan at age 60 and receive a pension).
48. See Heinsz, supra note 27, at 283 (noting that even if an employee
was able to “survive the hazards of job changes, layoffs, mergers, or business
failures, and . . . meet all of the conditions of the employer’s pension plan, the
insurance contract or trust indenture, or the collective bargaining agreement,
he may still be denied his pension.”). In Gallo v. Howard Stores Corp., the
plaintiff sued to receive early retirement pension benefits after relying on a
booklet issued by the company which failed to mention that the employee
needed the company’s consent to retire early and receive the pension to which
he had contributed for years. Gallo v. Howard Stores Corp., 145 F. Supp. 909,
910 (E.D. Pa. 1956). Setting aside a jury verdict that ruled that the plaintiff’s
reliance on the booklet was reasonable, the court held that the booklet could
not replace the tripartite contract between the employee, the employer, and
the insurance company guaranteeing the pension benefits—a contract the
plaintiff had never seen. Id. at 912.
49. See Tex. & N. O. R. Co. v. Jones, 103 S.W.2d 1043, 1046 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937).
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the offer and acceptance by performance
constituted a mutual consideration.50
The court was careful to note, however, that the pension
promise only became a “binding contract” after the employee
had continued his employment with the employer until
retirement and officially been awarded a pension.51
Finally, in a mistake not likely to be repeated by savvy
employers following the case, the company failed to include an
unconditional reservation of its right to terminate pension
payments at any time in the plan documents, instead only
reserving the right to cancel payments due to gross misconduct
by the former employee.52 Thus, many employees who forfeited
their pensions still remained unprotected by the contractual
framework.53
Even if an employee remained with his employer until
retirement, an employee could still be denied his pension based
on decisions by those administering the pension plan.54
Employers created boards composed of their executives to
administer pension plans, giving them the power to decide
whether an employee qualified for a pension.55 Their decisions
sometimes had harsh consequences for employees.56 For
example, in Menke v. Thompson, a federal appellate court
affirmed the denial of a pension to an employee of the Missouri
Pacific Railroad Company from 1886 to 1932.57 Any person who
voluntarily left employment, even for a day, was denied a
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1045-46.
52. Id. at 1046.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Jones, 103 S.W.2d at 1045. Employees in collectively bargained plans
at least had the representation of union officials on these boards. Heinsz,
supra note 27, at 284.
56. See Wallace, 13 N.E. 2d at 143 (company could abandon its pension
plan and any employees or former employees who had not yet qualified for a
pension were not entitled to any benefits—no matter how close they were to
qualifying for a pension); Heinsz, supra note 27, at 284 (“For example, boards
have been allowed to disqualify employees whom they concluded did not meet
physical disability requirements in a pension plan, despite medical evidence
to the contrary.”).
57. Menke,140 F.2d at 792.
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pension under the terms of the plan, and Menke went on strike
in July 1922 and did not return until October 1922.58 Although
the company argued that the pensions were gratuities, the
court found that even under the unilateral contract theory,
Menke was not entitled to his pension.59 The terms of the plan
gave the Board of Pensions nearly unbridled discretion to
interpret (and amend) the rules of the plan and decide
eligibility for a pension.60 The Board’s decision was final “‘in
the absence of fraud or such gross mistakes as imply bad faith
or a failure to exercise an honest judgment.’ The burden of
proof . . . was upon the appellant here, and, to sustain such a
showing, the evidence ‘must be more than a mere
preponderance, it must be overwhelming.’”61
Courts occasionally achieved equity in individual cases of
hardship through other legal theories while leaving the general
practice of deference to employers in place. Section 90 of the
Restatement of the Law of Contracts provides:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance [of a
definite and substantial character] on the part of
the promisee. . . and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.62
58. Id. at 787-88.
59. Id. at 790-92.
60. Id. at 791 (“[T]he company only obligated itself to pension such
employees as the Board of Pensions, in the fair exercise of the power
conferred upon it, determined to be eligible to receive the benefits of the
plan.”).
61. Id. (internal citations omitted); see Dowling v. Texas & N. O. R. Co.,
80 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (denying appellant a pension after
he worked for his railroad employer for approximately thirty-four years
because his voluntary separation of less than a year in the middle of his
employment violated the plan’s eligibility terms even though he “never had a
copy of the rules and regulations with reference to the pension”).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981). An example
that the Restatement gives of the concept is: “A promises B to pay him an
annuity during B’s life. B thereupon resigns a profitable employment, as A
expected that he might. B receives the annuity for some years, in the
meantime becoming disqualified from again obtaining good employment. A’s
promise is binding.” Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163, 163-68 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1959).
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Courts relied on the quasi-contractual theories of promissory
estoppel and unjust enrichment to temper the worst injustices
visited upon individual pension claimants.63 Those theories
were, however, applied narrowly and infrequently.64
Even when courts utilized quasi-contractual theories to
protect workers’ rights, the holdings were limited and did not
affect the overwhelming legal bias in favor of employers. In
Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., the court used unjust enrichment and
quantum meruit to reject a harsh enforcement of the pension
contract. 65 Lucas involved the purchase by Seagrave of another
company’s assets and an assumption of its liabilities under a
non-contributory pension plan.66 After consummating that
transaction, Seagrave terminated 30 of the 65 employees of the
company it acquired.67 The plaintiffs (terminated employees)
contended that Seagrave terminated them to avoid making
future contributions to the pension plan since forfeited pension
credits could be used to cover those obligations.68
The plaintiffs in Lucas alleged that the accrued pension
contributions were compensation for services already rendered,
63. West v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 225 P.2d 978, 982-83 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1951) (holding that repeated promises made by management to the plaintiff
that confirmed he would receive a pension according to the company’s
customary policy as he understood it may state a claim for promissory
estoppel where they induced him to remain on the job – even though the
plaintiff’s understanding of the company’s policy was incorrect); Hunter, 197
P.2d at 815-16 (finding in plaintiff’s favor where he retired and received
roughly half of his promised pension because even if a contract had not
existed, the gift would be enforceable under the doctrine of promissory
estoppel since the plaintiff knew about the pension promise and rejected
other offers of employment in reliance on the promise of a future pension).
64. Hughes, 117 N.E.2d at 883 (holding that the employer’s pension plan
constituted an unenforceable gratuity and rejecting plaintiff’s theory of
promissory estoppel because “there is no fraud, no intent to deceive and no
detrimental change of position” by the employee); Sbrogna v. Worcester
Stamped Metal Co., 234 N.E.2d 749 (Mass. 1968) (denying claim of unjust
enrichment where all of the plaintiffs’ previously-purchased retirement
annuities were cancelled by the defendant employer when they went on
strike after the expiration of their union’s collective bargaining agreement
with the employer).
65. Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338, 344 (D. Minn. 1967).
66. Id. at 340.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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and they were therefore entitled to recover the value even if
they did not meet the terms of the pension contract.69 Although
the court discussed how participants generally did not have
vested pension rights unless they had strictly met the terms of
the plan, the court “found no decision which has ruled directly
on the assertion of a quasi-contractual right of recovery of
pension benefits on the basis that such benefits are essentially
a form of compensation.”70 Instead, relying on cases about
collective bargaining agreements where pensions were held to
be a component of wages, the court found that as an employee
approaches retirement age, pension accruals “may even
overshadow his cash wages as consideration for his services.”71
Although noting that “present decisions apparently give no
weight or recognition to the existing and accepted
characteristic of pension plans as a mode of employee
compensation,” the court found theory rooted in quasi-contract
for protecting these workers terminated by an employer
allegedly attempting to avoid its obligations while retaining the
value of the unpaid services of the workers.72
While the Lucas case may seem to be an example of
judicial activism at its best, the procedural posture of the case
is a motion for summary judgment.73 Thus, in the end, all the
court does is to deny defendant’s motion and allow that
plaintiffs in such an egregious set of circumstances may have a
claim in quasi-contract if they can develop the facts to support
their theories—a difficult endeavor.74 More importantly, the
plaintiffs must prove that the employer acted in bad faith by
terminating the employees because simply dismissing an
employee nearing retirement who had not yet vested in his
pension rights would not be actionable. The employee was
found to have assumed such a risk.75 As the court stated:

69. Id. at 339-40.
70. Id. at 343.
71. Lucas, 277 F. Supp. at 343.
72. Id. at 344-45.
73. Id. at 339.
74. Id. at 346 (“At this stage of the record it is not clear whether the
facts of the instant case justify such a recovery.”)
75. Id.
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[I]t seems harsh to assert that employees assume
knowingly the risk of all contingencies which
might prevent their recovery of benefits; as if the
plan were a negotiated contract agreed upon
through arm’s length bargaining. It hardly seems
equitable to apply the literal contract language,
which may not have been inserted to cover such a
situation, to uncritically rule that employees
bear the risk of a group termination which may
not have been contemplated by the contract or
the actuarial expectations upon which the plan is
funded. Such a literal enforcement of plan
provisions may defeat rather than foster plan
purposes. This approach seems particularly
unjustifiable where there may be indications of
bad faith or where the doctrine of unjust
enrichment is invoked.76
Thus, even after courts acknowledged that employees had
contractual rights with respect to pension promises, few courts
were willing to deviate from enforcing strictly contracts written
and enforced by employers to meet their needs—leaving
workers with little recourse.77 As two law students presciently

76. Id.; James E. Coleman & Jonathan Herlands, Private Pension Plans:
The Prospects for Reform, 5 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 465, 477-78 (1973).
77. Some advocates for pension reform in the years leading up to the
passage of ERISA argued that courts should use a theory of deferred wages to
adjudicate pension disputes. The germs of the theory can be seen in the Lucas
case discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 65-76, but are
fundamentally derived from cases holding that pensions are considered
wages for the purpose of collective bargaining. See generally Inland Steel Co.
v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960
(“While, as the Company has demonstrated, a reasonable argument can be
made that the benefits flowing from such a plan are not ‘wages,’ we think the
better and more logical argument is on the other side, and certainly there is,
in our opinion, no sound basis for an argument that such a plan is not clearly
included in the phrase, ‘other conditions of employment.’”). The deferred
wages theory holds that when an employer contributes to a pension plan on
an employee’s behalf, these contributions are wages withheld and the
employee’s property. Comment, Consideration for the Employer’s Promise of a
Voluntary Pension Plan, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 96, 102 (1955). As a result, the
employee’s right to the funds vests immediately when they are withheld, and
he does not forfeit this property even if terminated for cause. Id. at 103;
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wrote in a journal article on the eve of ERISA’s passage:
In view of the many possible ways employees can
lose their benefits, it would seem logical and
desirable as a matter of public policy for the
courts to strive to safeguard the rights of pension
plan participants. . . . [T]he courts have not
attempted to achieve this aim. . . . [T]he courts’
strict interpretation of pension plans, the paucity
of available legal theories to support recoveries
by employees, and the hesitancy of the courts to
utilize those few theories that have been
accepted, have vitiated the potential of the
judiciary to champion workers’ rights and
institute reform.78
III. The Triumph of ERISA’s Private Litigation Remedy
While struggling over the details of pension reform,
Congress sought to regulate a field dominated by the private
actors who had administered pension plans for decades without
significant government intervention. Proposed legislation left

Coleman & Herlands, supra note 76, at 478-79 (quoting Senator Williams:
“Pensions are not gratuities, but earnings saved and deferred to retirement.
They represent compensation which the employee would have received in his
paycheck had he not belonged to a pension plan.” ). While many argue that a
theory of deferred wages presents itself in the cases under the contractual
framework because deferred wages form a basis for finding the consideration
necessary for contract formation, this theory takes a leap to immediate
vesting not found in the case law.
The theory of deferred wages does have its problems, although it at least
respects the importance of pension promises. First, when focusing on the
defined benefit plans more prevalent at this time, pension benefits are based
on a formula that emphasizes earnings late in a career and years of service –
reducing the value of pension benefits accrued for much of an employee’s
earlier service and stacking the deck for work in later years. Id. at 467.
Second, the goal of private pensions is to help workers maintain quality of life
during retirement. Id. at 479. Treating pension accruals as wages may result
in a feeling that employees should have the right to spend the money now
instead of engaging in the always difficult process of delayed gratification. Id.
Pension portability would help solve the temptation to treat deferred wages
as current wages, however. Id. at 467, 479.
78. Coleman & Herlands, supra note 76, at 474.
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the task of daily administration of private pensions to
employers and their representatives.79 Any legislation
requiring employers to fund pension plans with no control over
who would receive a pension, when, and for how much would
discourage the formation or maintenance of these voluntary
plans.80
Given the extent of the authority it was delegating to
employers as fiduciaries, Congress faced an important question
when deciding who would enforce the bargain reached to better
protect workers against abuses: (1) the bureaucracy—and if so,
which agency, or (2) the courts. In the end, Congress split
regulatory authority between the Department of Labor (“DOL”)
and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to resolve conflict
between congressional committees, bureaucratic agencies, and
interest groups.81 The result was overlap, confusion, and
inefficiency, which left the bulk of the ERISA enforcement
responsibilities to the courts and to the participants themselves
who would initiate lawsuits in the absence of bureaucratic
enforcement.82
A. The Death of the Single Agency Proposal
In his congressional testimony discussed above, Frank
Cummings argued that because pension rights were litigated
rarely as a result of the large costs involved and the small
potential recovery, “you need an agency to enforce these private
rights, or a union.”83 But which agency? The Department of

79. See generally Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 138 (statement of Frank Cummings). Cummings asserted that
the Internal Revenue Service could not be an enforcement agency because:
[i]t isn’t equipped to enforce private rights. Only the Labor
Department is, which, after all, enforces private rights all
the time. For example, if you don’t pay time and one-half for
overtime, you go to the Labor Department and the Labor
Department says “do it” and it goes into the court and the
judge says “do it.” So, if you want to protect private rights,
you have to create private rights and you have to create an
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Commerce was viewed as favorable to business, while the
Department of Labor supposedly sided with workers. 84 The
Internal Revenue Service already helped regulate the tax
qualification of pension plans.85
The debate over where to place enforcement authority
within the bureaucracy embroiled congressmen, their
committees, and their business and labor constituencies for
years.86 Their inability to agree on where to locate enforcement
duties doomed the proposal of a single, powerful agency
regulating private pensions and consequently enhanced the
significance of the private litigation remedy.87
When Senator Javits introduced the first comprehensive
bill for pension reform, the Pension and Employee Benefit Act
of 1967, he proposed a single agency with oversight—”an
independent commission that would have jurisdiction over the
new regulations as well as most existing federal oversight of
employee benefit plans.”88 Drawing on recent pension
agency that will enforce those private rights.
Id. at 139.
84. While unions and the Democrats who traditionally represented them
favored enforcement by the DOL, employers favored the Securities and
Exchange Commission or Internal Revenue Service since the Department of
Commerce lacked expertise in the area. See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 47 (2004).
85. Id. at 45.
86. Id. at 45-49.
87. Controversy over which part of the bureaucracy should have
oversight of pension regulation began in the decades prior to ERISA’s
enactment as momentum for pension reform built. Legislation to force
increased and more accurate disclosure from plans was gutted prior to
passage because of disagreement over the location and extent of enforcement
powers. An Eisenhower bill from January 1956 required pension plans to
report to the DOL, the traditional regulators of the employment relationship.
The Douglas-Ives-Murray bill introduced in May 1956 in the Senate,
however, provided that pension plans would register and file reports with the
SEC. Employees would receive summaries of plan terms, and the SEC could
penalize incomplete or inaccurate disclosure with fines or imprisonment. In
the end, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 placed
oversight within the DOL but denied automatic disclosure to employees and
eliminated penalties for false statements, omissions, and even embezzlement.
Thus, the legislation denied the DOL “the investigative and enforcement
authority it would need to implement the law.” Id., at 45-49, 121-22.
88. Id. at 129-30. Senator Williams also called in February 1972 for “the
centralization in one agency of all existing as well as prospective regulation of
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legislation in Ontario,89 Javits’ “United States Pension and
Employee Benefit Plan Commission” would have included five
members appointed by the President with the advice and
counsel of the Senate.90 Among the duties of the Commission
were “to promote the establishment, extension, and
improvement” of pension plans and to register or decline to
register plans.91 As part of those duties, the Commission had
the power to inspect the books and records of pension plans and
broadly “to require any such administrator, employer, insurer,
trustee, or other person to furnish, in a form acceptable to the
Commission, such information as the Commission deems
necessary for the purpose of ascertaining whether this Act and
regulations of the Commission hereunder have been or are
being complied with.”92
Although those working on pension reform had assumed
that all vesting, funding, and termination insurance proposals
would amend the tax code, Javits and his staff placed all
elements of his bill under the labor laws to avoid the powerful
and hostile House Ways and Means Committee and instead
give jurisdiction to the Senate Labor Committee.93 Thus began
a lengthy battle between congressional committees with
jurisdiction over labor matters and those supervising
taxation.94 The single agency proposal fell victim to the
jurisdictional dispute.95
As soon as Javits proposed a single agency to administer
pension reform, opposition to the idea arose. A memorandum
private pension plans.” Id. at 177.
89. See Province of Ontario, Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1 1965 (Can.);
Letter from Allen E. Kaye to Frank Cummings (Mar. 7, 1966) (on file with
Senator Jacob K. Javits Collection, Special Collections, Stony Brook
University Libraries); Letter from R. M. Gaby to Allen E. Kaye (Mar. 21,
1966) (on file with Senator Jacob K. Javits Collection, Special Collections,
Stony Brook University Libraries); Letter from Laurence E. Coward to Allen
E. Kaye (Mar. 24, 1966) (on file with Senator Jacob K. Javits Collection,
Special Collections, Stony Brook University Libraries).
90. Pension and Employee Benefit Act of 1967, S. 1103, 90th CONG.
§ 3(a) (1st Sess. 1967).
91. S. 1103 at § 4(a).
92. Id. at § 4(b).
93. WOOTEN, supra note 84, at 129-31.
94. See generally id. at 130-180.
95. Id. at 178.
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from the Bureau of the Budget (“BOB Memo”) dated September
8, 1967 explains why even without “thorough study” of current
and prospective pension regulation, “[i]t does not appear
feasible to vest all functions relating to pension plans in a
single agency” and “[i]t does not appear feasible to vest the new
functions, or the existing functions which may be separable, in
a new agency.”96 The BOB Memo argued that a single agency
was unworkable because pension functions already performed
by existing agencies were tied to their core missions.97 For
example, the IRS determination of qualification for tax
deductions was related to basic tax administration.98
“Similarly, Labor’s functions with respect to bargaining rights
and overtime rate computations with respect to pension plans
do not appear separable from its broader role in those areas.”99
No explanation of why these tasks could not be performed by a
different agency is given.
The BOB Memo finds problems with creating an
independent agency to administer and enforce pension
regulation—or as much as can be separated from existing
agencies:
Such an agency, even with the broadest possible
program now envisioned, would be small and
isolated from the major policy-making agencies of
Government. It would have little chance of access
to the President, and problems could develop in
trying to develop its programs in the context of
related programs affecting the labor force and
income maintenance in other agencies.100
The Johnson administration task force considering pension
reform opposed bureaucratic consolidation for practical

96. Memorandum from the Exec. Office of the President, Bureau of the
Budget, Howard Schnoor for Mr. March on Organization For Private Pension
Plan Program (Sept. 8, 1967) (on file with the Senator Jacob K. Javits
Collection, Special Collections, Stony Brook University Libraries).
97. See generally, id.
98. Id. at 2.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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reasons.101 Representative Wilbur Mills, chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee, opposed many of the reforms
proposed.102 Focusing on substantive reforms in areas such as
vesting and funding, the task force wanted to avoid Mills by
drafting a bill under the jurisdiction of labor committees in
Congress and enforced by the DOL.103 This made consolidation
of the IRS’ current pension duties impossible at the time
(although Mills and congressional tax committees later become
involved in pension reform).104
For the next several years, Javits continued to push for a
single agency to enforce ERISA within the bureaucracy. On
May 14, 1969, he again introduced legislation that sought to
“establish an SEC-style agency” that would have oversight of
new pension standards and “any existing regulatory standards
dealing with pension and welfare plans that now rest in other
Federal agencies.”105 Recognizing the deep divisions even
among those involved within the pension reform movement,
Javits hedged: “I do not, however, claim that this bill
represents the only way of dealing with problems in the
pension field; there are other approaches which can and should
be explored.”106
Further study of the structure of pension regulation
emphasized the political difficulties of consolidating
enforcement within a single agency while acknowledging its
benefits. The Secretaries of Labor and Commerce on April 14,
1969 charged a Joint Task Force with reviewing the “‘security’
issues of vesting, funding, insurance and portability.”107 The

101. STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 212-13 (1997).
102. Id. at 212.
103. Id
104. Id. at 212-13.
105. Press Release, Office of Senator Jacob K. Javits, Javits Seeks SECType Agency to Oversee $100-Billion Private Pension Plans; Bill Protects
Against Last-Minute Pension Forfeiture After Long Service (May 14, 1969)
(on file with the Senator Jacob K. Javits Collection, Special Collections, Stony
Brook University Libraries).
106. Id.
107. JOINT LABOR/COMMERCE TASK FORCE, 91ST CONG., REP. ON REVIEW
OF PENSION SECURITY ISSUES AND OPTIONS (on file with the Senator Jacob K.
Javits Collection, Special Collections, Stony Brook University Libraries).
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Task Force included in its resulting report a chapter that
examined potential routes of administration and enforcement
for pension reform legislation.108 Specifically, it looked at the
questions: (1) “Should all pension plan activities of the Federal
government be vested in a single agency?” and (2) “Assuming
that pension regulatory functions should be consolidated in a
single agency, should that agency constitute a new independent
regulatory agency?”109
The Task Force concluded that a single agency should
administer and enforce all pension regulation.110 Among the
benefits of the single agency concept noted were easing the
burden on employers administering pension plans, reducing
duplication, and achieving coordinated pension policy to
safeguard pensions while also encouraging the expansion of
private pension plans.111 “A single agency, possessed of all the
expertise and experience available, would be able to focus in
the most efficient and flexible way on the complex and dynamic
aspects of the private pension system.”112
The Task Force acknowledged that the real question was
not whether the federal government’s regulation of pensions
should be consolidated in a single agency but instead whether
such an action was “feasible.”113 Jurisdiction over pension
issues was already fragmented because it involved the IRS,
DOL, SEC, National Labor Relations Board, Department of
Justice, and assorted other agencies applying their rules to
pension plans.114 It might not be possible to avoid IRS and
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. REP. ON REVIEW OF PENSION SECURITY ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra
note 107. The report notes that current jurisdiction included: (1) the IRS
management of tax qualification of plans and employer deductions; (2) the
DOL enforcement of wage and hour laws that are affected by pension credits
and gathering of labor statistics; (3) the SEC’s application of rules to plan
investments and information gathering on the same; (4) the NLRB’s
oversight of the Taft Hartley’s provisions on whether pension plans penalize
union members and are fairly bargained; (5) the enforcement by the DOJ of a
section of the Taft Hartley Act dealing with improper use of benefit funds for
purposes not benefiting employees; and (6) the application of EEOC, HUD,
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Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) interaction with
pension plans, for example, because their missions touched on
the conduct of plans (as the BOB Memo had noted).115 If all
pension matters could not be brought under one roof, the
benefits of consolidation could not be fully achieved.116
Most of the DOL’s pension functions, such as enforcement
of disclosure standards,117 were found capable of transfer and
consolidation, but it was more difficult to transfer all IRS
duties to another agency. Functions such as determinations
that plans met qualification standards and the gathering of
data on pension plans could be consolidated, but concerns of
tax evasion, discrimination by pension plans in favor of highly
compensated employees, and allowable deductions by
employers and exclusions of trust income from taxation by
pension plans related to the IRS’ tax policy mission.118 The
report concluded that “centralization to the maximum feasible
extent” was still worthwhile given the benefits that would
result. 119
The Task Force then considered which agency should
administer and enforce pension regulation—an existing agency
and DOD regulations to benefit plans. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. The report cites Javits’ seeming concern over the difficulties of
implementing a single agency proposal:
It may be that the entire scope of Treasury operations
affecting pension plans should be transferred to the
Commission. And yet, such determinations as the manner of
integrating pension benefits with social security benefits
and the determination of reasonable levels of compensation
obviously have an important impact on Federal revenue
considerations. Similarly, the extent to which regulations of
pension plan investments is now performed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission warrants careful
consideration as to what functions, if any, should be
transferred to the proposed Commission.
Id. (quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 4653 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits)).
117. Id.
118. REP. ON REVIEW OF PENSION SECURITY ISSUES AND Options, supra
note 107. The need for the Secretary of Labor to use the value of employee
benefits as a component in the prevailing wage rates used to set the
minimum wages was not readily subject to consolidation, though. Id.
119. Id.
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and, if so, which one, or a new, independent agency.120
Although the IRS was perhaps the best qualified to handle
complex pension matters, “the public interest factor [of pension
reform] transcends revenue considerations.”121 At the SEC, the
mission to regulate securities might force labor and pension
issues to a subsidiary role despite the SEC’s experience
handling disclosure, investments, and fiduciary law. While
pension regulation did not clash with any preexisting core
agency mission at the DOL, the report noted correctly that a
decision to consolidate regulation at the DOL would result in
backlash from employers.122
Uncertain which existing agency should have primary
responsibility for pensions, the Task Force addressed the
advantages and disadvantages of creating a new, independent
body.123 Although independent agencies are typically thought to
have greater political independence from the President (and
thus have greater continuity of staffing at high levels), be more
bipartisan, and be more efficient since they are focused on the
statute they administer, the Task Force found no clear support
for these supposed advantages. Similarly, the evidence was
inconclusive on the supposed disadvantages of independent
agencies, including that the President cannot control them or
coordinate their policies, they are more readily subject to
capture by the industries they regulate, and they have trouble
juggling administration and enforcement with long-term policy
coordination. The Task Force concluded by refusing to take a
position on whether consolidation within an existing agency or
the creation of a new agency was preferable, noting that
political factors should influence the choice.124 The fact that
this group agreed that consolidation within a single agency was
best but could not agree on which agency should have primary
power to administer and enforce pension laws indicates how
sensitive the issue was and how difficult the task of
consolidation would be.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. REP.
note 107.
124. Id.
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Ironically, however, labor put the final nail in the coffin of
Javits’ proposal for an independent agency with oversight of
pension regulation. Javits attempted to gain the support of
labor by placing that independent agency within the DOL in a
draft bill proposed in February 1972.125 He did this in spite of
arguing earlier that his U.S. Pension and Employee Benefit
Commission, should have jurisdiction over pension regulation
(including tax qualification) instead of the Department of
Labor.126 The AFL-CIO, however, rejected his proposal.127 After
years of government scrutiny of labor actions, including
hearings focusing on pension misdeeds by union leaders, the
organization did not want to empower another government
agency to investigate unions.128 If any agency was to have such
power, it would need to be the DOL—the traditional friend of
labor—not an independent and unknown power within that
agency.129
Javits was forced to advocate instead for consolidation of
pension regulation within the DOL instead of an independent
agency. Cummings’ congressional testimony is illustrative of
Javits’ position that an independent commission was best but
given the lack of support for that idea, the DOL should manage
as much ERISA enforcement as possible.130 Cummings argued
that an independent, SEC-like commission was the best answer
for pension reform (as he helped Javits argue for years)
because it could consolidate pension expertise and place all

125. WOOTEN, supra note 84, at 178.
126. See Pension & Welfare Plans: Hearing on S. 3421, S. 1024, S.1103,
and S. 1255 Before: the S. Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor and
Pub. Welfare, 90th CONG. 122 (1968) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits) (“I
think that the question of whether the Commission should run it or the
Secretary of Labor should run it is a substantive difference, perhaps of a
major character.”).
127. WOOTEN, supra note 84, at 178 (“Labor leaders ‘feel they must have
‘their man’ in the Cabinet to protect them against the possibilities of extreme
action . . . .’ The same concern led the AFL-CIO to demand Labor Department
oversight of pension regulation. An ‘independent agency . . . housed at the
[DOL]’ would not do. The idea had to go and did.”).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9, at 223-27 (1973)
(statement of Frank Cummings).
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regulation under one agency for “one-stop service.”131 His key
point here is the importance of consolidating all pension
expertise in one agency to strengthen bureaucratic regulation:
If the pension thrust of the IRS really has such
extensive expertise, there is no reason why the
personnel of that branch could not be
transferred, en masse, to such a commission. If
there is expertise in the Bureau of the Labor
Department which now administers the
Disclosure Act, the personnel of that branch
could be transferred there, to such a
Commission. With a corps of personnel like that,
drawn from the IRS, the Labor Department, and
perhaps also from the SEC, the Justice
Department and from State Agencies preempted
by federal law, I would doubt very much that any
great additional bureaucracy would be needed.132
The same results could not be achieved merely by
consolidating such expertise within an existing agency such as
the IRS or DOL because they were already devoted to their
core missions and would not devote the same attention and
resources to pension regulation.133
Yet, given that “no one seemed interested” during the
years Javits pushed for the independent commission and there
was “no evidence of increasing interest in it now,” any
consolidation of pension regulation needed to take place within
the IRS or DOL.134 Only the DOL was qualified to respond to
employee complaints since the IRS—not used to responding to
complaints from workers—offered merely the remedy of tax
penalties or disqualification for the pension plan. This would
present the employee the equivalent remedy of cutting off one’s
nose to spite one’s face since the plan would then be less able to
131. REP. ON REVIEW OF PENSION SECURITY ISSUES AND Options, supra
note 107.
132. Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9, at 223-27 (1973)
(statement of Frank Cummings).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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pay the employee pension benefits because its assets would be
diminished by increased taxes on earnings and tax penalties.135
This left the DOL as the best of the “half-loaf” options.136
Congressional hearings held immediately prior to the
passage of ERISA indicate the ongoing dispute over regulatory
jurisdiction. Senator Javits and other reform advocates
affiliated with congressional labor committees as well as
unions137 thought the DOL should have as large a role as

135. Id. (“The IRS is not essentially an investigating and enforcing
agency. . . . Indeed, if a pension participant were to go to the IRS and
complain . . . he would only be cutting his own throat. The most he could
accomplish would be to disqualify the plan, and if he did so, he would be, in
effect, reducing his own pension.”).
136. Influential pension scholar Merton Bernstein argued against “halfloaf” pension reform as “legislation that is inadequate and less than can be
attained.” Second Panel Discussion on Private Pension Plan Reform, Vesting
and Funding Provisions; Termination Insurance; Portability; and Fiduciary
Standards: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., Subcomm. on Private
Pension Plans, 93d CONG. 828 (1973) (statement of Merton Bernstein).
Rebutting the argument that the legislation could be enhanced in the future,
he asserted, “Pension reform factors are approaching a critical mass. Once
legislation results, that mass will be dissipated.” Id.
137. Testimony by union representatives for the United Steelworkers of
America and the United Auto Workers shows that they preferred jurisdiction
within the DOL to the IRS. Similarly, a summary of AFL-CIO testimony
provides that it:
Urges that the [DOL] administer the pension plan
requirements, as in S. 4. Considers pension plans to be an
integral part of the collective bargaining process. Suggests
that placing the administration in an agency whose primary
interest is in collection of taxes may place the agency in a
conflict-of-interest situation in relation to policing any
funding standard because the more rapidly a pension plan
funds, the less it pays in taxes. Maintains that regulatory
supervision under the IRS hinges on an employer’s self
interest in obtaining tax deductions. Feels that this is a very
weak enforcement mechanism from the viewpoint of the
beneficiaries. Considers possible IRS solutions to
noncompliance to not really protect the interests of
beneficiaries because if the plan’s tax exemption is removed
or the plan terminated, this does not help the beneficiaries.
Asserts that better administration would occur if a single
agency were to be responsible for both enforcement and
reporting.
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possible.138 Employers, their interest groups, and members of
congressional tax committees favored primary IRS jurisdiction
because they viewed the DOL as biased in favor of employees.
The testimony of Senators Javits and Williams before the
Senate Finance Committee’s Subcommittee on Private Pension
Plans shows not only the ongoing jurisdictional dispute over
pension regulation within the Senate but also how Javits and
Williams hedged and left the door open for significant IRS
involvement because it was politically expedient.139 Senator
Javits stated that employers’ primary motivation for
maintaining pension plans is to improve employee morale and
“employee relations,” elements of the DOL’s mission140 Among
the other reasons cited why IRS administration was
inappropriate was that half of pension plans were collectively
bargained, tax penalties were insufficient, only the DOL

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX’N, 93d CONG., DIG. OF
TESTIMONY ON PROPOSALS FOR PRIVATE PENSION PLAN REFORM 37 (Comm.
Print 1973).
138. A summary of testimony on the proper administering agency and
enforcement for pension legislation shows that the American Bankers
Association and the Chamber of Commerce believed that the IRS should have
jurisdiction because of its expertise and impartiality. Interestingly, the
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) felt that “regulatory functions
in the pension area performed by the various departments and agencies of
government should continue under their respective jurisdictions and should
not be centralized in one agency, thus preserving the technical expertise
required.” Id. at 38. Perhaps not incidentally, the NAM’s position was also
likely to (and did in fact) continue the existing inefficiency and uncoordinated
regulation of pension promises.
139. Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9, at 278-86
(remarks of Sen. Javits and Sen. Williams).
140. Id. at 284. Senator Williams added,
Now it just seems to me that we have reached a point where
pension legislation most clearly falls within the state
purpose in the law of the [DOL] as a Department “to foster,
promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the
United States and to improve their working conditions and
to advance their opportunities for profitable employment.”
This is intimately part of the job of benefit protection and,
historically, that part of the workers’ arrangement with his
employer has been watched over under law and regulation
by the [DOL].
Id. at 283.
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jurisdiction would provide the necessary preemption of state
law to ensure coordinated policy, and—most importantly—that
the primary mission of the IRS is collecting revenue through
taxes and pension regulation would suffer from the IRS’ need
to focus on its core mission.141
When members of the Senate Finance Committee
questioned Javits and Williams as to whether they believed
that there was any role for the IRS in pension regulation, they
relented and agreed to some form of IRS involvement. As Javits
said “[a]gain . . . this doesn’t denigrate the interests of the tax
authorities nor their interest in the deductions which are taken
for payment to pension plans. They have a vital interest. We
don’t challenge that at all.”142 When trying to define exactly the
ongoing role that they foresaw for the IRS in pension
regulation, however, Senators Javits and Williams ran into
trouble. As Senator Williams admitted, “this is not finally
formed in my mind”—even after many years of work on the
issue.143 Senator Javits added that the IRS would have a role in
determining reasonableness of compensation for purposes of
discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees as
well as enforcing eligibility and vesting standards “for tax

141. Id. at 282.
Senator, we believe very strongly that the weight of
administrative judgment is for administration in the Labor
Department because, while you are absolutely right about
the fact that IRS is doing more than they did, the fact is
that it is still their primary jurisdiction to collect taxes and
punish evasion and define people who evade. This
represents such an enormous range in which they must
operate, that pension plan supervision would only be one
item.
Id.; see WOOTEN, supra note 84, at 205 (explaining that it was uncertain
whether the IRS’ implementation of the power to tax could include
preemption of state pension regulation while the DOL’s control of the
employment relationship through Congress’ power to regulate interstate
commerce allowed for such preemption.
142. Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9, at 278 (remarks
of Sen. Javits and Sen. Williams).
143. Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9, at 286 (remarks
of Sen. Williams).
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purposes only.”144
Having conceded a necessary role for the IRS in areas like
eligibility, vesting, and funding, Senators Javits and Williams
then faced questions about the problem of dual—and
potentially conflicting—jurisdiction in these areas if the DOL
also regulated here.145 This is the question not fully resolved as
the parties fought over jurisdiction and reached a compromise
that involved duplication, overlap, and conflict.
B. The Inability of the Bureaucracy to Enforce ERISA
The administration and enforcement regime put in place
under ERISA divides responsibility between the DOL and the
Department of Treasury (mainly the IRS).146 Pensions
historically fell within the purview of the IRS because they
needed to be qualified for favorable tax treatment. As discussed
above, however, the deferred wages theory of pensions also
makes pension regulation part of the DOL’s mission.
Turf battles within Congress and the bureaucracy resulted
in the political compromise of overlapping—and frequently
conflicting—jurisdiction.147 Indeed, even while the Conference
Committee was resolving the final details of dual
administration of ERISA by the DOL and IRS, many doubted
that the statute could be effectively enforced in the planned
manner. As staff members noted at one point, “While
recognizing the staffs have made a valiant effort to resolve the
jurisdictional problem, some staff members believe the

144. Id. (remarks of Sen. Javits).
145. Id. at 288.
146. A newly created agency—the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation—also administers the statute’s insurance program, but its
involvement is not relevant to this discussion. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra
note 26, at 90.
147. S. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., IMPLEMENTATION OF
ERISA IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974; THE FIRST DECADE 83 (Comm. Print 1984) (prepared by
Beverly M. Klimkowsky) [hereinafter Klimkowsky] (“When President Ford
signed ERISA into law on Labor Day 1974, the administrative apparatus
charged with implementing the new law reflected the ambiguity concerning
the proper jurisdictional sphere for the law and continued congressional
rivalry over turf.”).
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proposed solution falls short of eliminating the inevitable
complexities, costs and inequities which will result from dual
jurisdiction and enforcement.”148
After the passage of ERISA, it quickly became clear that
dual jurisdiction needed to be sorted out for the agencies to
implement ERISA. The impracticalities of the IRS and DOL
issuing regulations together slowed the process of
implementation.149 By executive order, President Carter issued
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978.150 The IRS gained exclusive
control over participation, vesting, and funding (among other
areas), while the DOL governs fiduciary management and
disclosure and prohibited transactions.151 The DOL and IRS
also share control over decisions regarding whether a plan
meets the exclusive benefit rule.152 This plan completed the
transition away from the previous notion that the DOL would
have primary control of pension regulation.
Early conflicts within the DOL after ERISA’s passage also
prevented effective administration and enforcement of
fiduciary obligations. DOL leaders could not even agree on an
internal structure for pension regulation. For three years and
under five different administrators, the agency struggled with
whether to house ERISA responsibilities under a new Assistant
Secretary or under the existing Labor Management Services
Administration that administered the Welfare and Pension
Plan Disclosure Act but had other primary responsibilities.
After three years, the DOL finally decided upon the Office of
Pension Benefit Welfare Programs reporting to the Assistant
Secretary for Labor Management Relations—at least for the
moment.153
Effective administration and enforcement of fiduciary
responsibilities at the DOL was also hampered by the
148. Staff Comments Relating to Jurisdictional Matters: Before Pension
Reform Leg. House/Senate Conference on HR 2, 98th Cong. (1974) (on file
with Senator Jacob K. Javits Collection, Special Collections, Stony Brook
University Libraries).
149. Klimkowsky, supra note 147, at 84.
150. Exec. Order No. 12108, 44 F.R. 1065 (Jan. 3, 1979), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/exec_order_no4.html.
151. Klimkowsky, supra note 147, at 95.
152. Id.; LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 91.
153. Klimkowsky, supra note 147, at 86-87.
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complexity of ERISA and the agency’s lack of resources.154
Policy analyst Beverly Klimkowsky noted in a paper prepared
for the Senate Special Committee on Aging on the tenth
anniversary of ERISA:
As one of the most complex laws Congress ever
passed, ERISA suffers from having an unclear
mandate. Multiple jurisdiction is a major
example of congressional indecision being
papered over and left to the administrators to
sort out. Some of ERISA’s provisions (e.g.,
paperwork)
are
too
specific,
leaving
administrators with little flexibility. Many other
provisions were so vague that over 100
regulations needed to be issued.155
The DOL lacked financial and manpower resources
initially to administer this complex statute.156 The IRS had
many pension experts on staff already because of its previous
work in the area, but the DOL lacked expertise and
experienced higher turnover.157
Although the Reorganization Plan allocated tasks more
efficiently between the IRS and DOL and aided administration
greatly, enforcement was still an issue of concern.158 The IRS
and DOL maintained control over enforcement in their
respective areas of ERISA, making coordinated pension policy
difficult to achieve.159 The Secretary Labor has the power to file
or intervene (in most circumstances) in civil lawsuits related to
its areas of administration and also assess civil penalties. 160
The Secretary of Labor can also investigate conduct that may
constitute a violation of ERISA’s title I by reviewing books and

154. Id. at 87-88.
155. Id. at 88.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 88-89, 93.
158. Id. at 84, 98 (“ERISA enforcement constitutes the weakest link in
implementation . . .”).
159. Klimkowsky, supra note 147, at 95-97.
160. ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012); BLOOMBERG BNA EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAW § 3-14 (3d ed. 2012).
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records and interviewing the relevant people where “reasonable
cause” to believe there has been a violation exists or where the
plan gives consent.161 No plan, however, can be forced to
provide its books and records to the DOL more than once in a
12 month period unless such “reasonable cause” to believe
there has been a violation exists.162 The DOL engaged in few
enforcement activities until a lengthy and involved matter with
the Central State Teamsters Plan, and the DOL’s problems
with internal organization left overall enforcement
inadequate.163
After a critical report by the General Accounting Office
(“GAO”) in 1977, the DOL announced that it would use the
significant case theory to guide its enforcement efforts—
requiring regional audits of large pension plans.164 The
significant case theory was controversial, however.165 What
constituted a large plan in one region might not in another.166
In addition, the strategy left the many participants in small
plans unprotected.167 The Solicitor’s Office was also
overwhelmed and unable to respond to all proposed cases.168
When Reagan took office, however, personnel at the DOL
changed and the significant case strategy ended.169 Other
strategies of emphasizing criminal cases and more centralized
enforcement were attempted.170
Since that time, reports on DOL enforcement of ERISA’s
fiduciary provisions have routinely been critical.171 The GAO’s
January 1989 report to the House Ways and Means

161. ERISA § 504(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1134(a) (2012); see BLOOMBERG BNA
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 160, at § 3-13.
162. ERISA § 504(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1134 (2012); see BLOOMBERG BNA
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 160, at § 3-13.
163. Klimkowsky, supra note 147, at 97.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Klimkowsky, supra note 147, at 97.
170. Id. at 97-98.
171. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-89-32, PENSION PLANS:
LABOR AND IRS ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT (1989).
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Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight found that the DOL’s
enforcement efforts had a limited reach.172 By 1994, the GAO
noted improvements made by the DOL in enforcement but still
had substantial recommendations for change in its report
entitled Pension Plans: Strong Labor ERISA Enforcement
Should Better Protect Plan Participants.173 Of the 117 cases
referred to the DOL Solicitor’s Office for civil litigation or to the
Department of Justice for criminal litigation, only 38 lawsuits
were filed.174
Recent problems found with DOL ERISA enforcement
include a lack of plan audits and resources for proper
enforcement. After once again noting significant problems in
2002, the GAO (which now stands for the Government
Accountability Office) issued another report in January 2007
finding protection of participants still inadequate.175 The DOL
still did not have an accurate picture of ERISA noncompliance
and therefore could not properly target its enforcement

172. See id. at 2-4. During the period examined, fiscal years 1985 to
1987, the DOL only closed roughly 1,300 pension plan investigations per
year, though in 1987 there were an estimated 870,350 private pension plans.
Id. Only one in four plans investigated were cited for ERISA violations, and
the number was one in five for the first eight months of fiscal year 1988. Id.
The DOL found 574 fiduciary violations in 1987. Id.
173. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-94-157, PENSION PLANS:
STRONGER LABOR ERISA ENFORCEMENT SHOULD BETTER PROTECT PLAN
PARTICIPANTS 1-2 (1994). Area office enforcement staff had grown from 266 to
365 between 1986 to 1993. Id. at 5. By program year 1993, the number of
investigations closed was 2,998 (although 1,480 of these cases had been
opened to test computer targeting programs that were still in the exploration
stage). Id. While the DOL managed to recover $183 million for plans and
“impact” 72,199 plans and 21 million participants in 1993 with its focus on
“significant issue” cases, only 303 cases resulted in a monetary recovery, only
125 had fiduciary results (fiduciaries were removed, fiduciaries were forced to
diversify plan investments or discontinue a particular investment, or other
administrative practices were altered) and only 187 cases had non-fiduciary
results (changes were made to comply with reporting and disclosure or
bonding requirements). Id. at 5-6.
174. Id. at 6. The report recommended reviewing the amount of
resources focused on the “significant issue” strategy, focusing more on
targeted computer programs, and increasing the use of penalties. Id. at 1415.
175. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-22, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION: ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS MADE BUT
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS COULD FURTHER ENHANCE PENSION PLAN OVERSIGHT
(2007).
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efforts.176 The DOL did not conduct routine plan audits or risk
assessments like other agencies and was focused on problems
identified by plan sponsors, participants, or other agencies.177
Finally, although it had recruited more skilled personnel
needed to administer the complex statute, the DOL had a high
attrition rate for related personnel.178 By fiscal year 2005, the
DOL’s Office of the Solicitor litigated only 178 of the 258
ERISA civil cases referred by the DOL’s Employee Benefit
Security Administration (“EBSA”).179 As the report
summarized:
EBSA is a relatively small agency facing the
daunting challenge of safeguarding the
retirement assets of millions of American
workers, retirees, and their families. . . . EBSA’s
ability to protect plan participants against the
misuse of pension plan assets is still limited,
because its enforcement approach is not as
comprehensive as those of other federal agencies,
and generally focuses only on what it derives
from its investigations.180
The importance of enforcing ERISA’s fiduciary provisions
is clear from ERISA’s legislative history.181 Yet Congress has
never provided funding or authorization sufficient for the DOL
to audit plans on a regular basis as the SEC and banking
agencies do to enforce regulations in their sectors.182 Given the
current economic climate and push for deficit reduction, it is
highly unlikely that the executive agencies will soon be given

176. Id.
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id. at 2-4. The DOL’s Employee Benefits Security Administration
(“EBSA”) had a ratio of personnel to regulated plans/entities of 1:8,000 as
compared to 1:3,000 for the IRS and 1:9 for the SEC. Id. at 10.
179. Formerly called the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration.
Id. at 11.
180. GAO-07-22, at 28.
181. Beverly M. Klimkowsky & Ian D. Lanoff, ERISA Enforcement:
Mandate for a Single Agency, 19 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 89, 96-97 (1985).
182. Id. at 97.
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the resources necessary for proper enforcement.183
Years after the passage of ERISA, there are still calls for a
single agency to administer the statute and its amendments.
As one article noted, “A review of fiduciary enforcement, in
particular, indicates that the Department of Labor cannot
enforce ERISA; the IRS does not enforce ERISA; and
coordination in this area does not function well.”184 Its authors
argued that the only hope for proper enforcement of the statute
and coordinated policymaking was a single agency with
jurisdiction over private pension regulation.185
183. See Julius G. Getman, Public Policy Implications of ERISA, 68 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 473, 476 (1994) (“Complex statutes are inevitably difficult to
enforce. Enforcement of a statute of this magnitude and complexity requires
a major bureaucracy. The need for this type of bureaucracy, however, is
arising at a time when public opinion is strongly opposed to governmental
expansion. . . . It would be difficult to reconcile today’s hostility toward
increasing bureaucracy with the need for the expanded bureaucracy required
to enforce ERISA. Enforcing the statute selectively would create more
complexity, confusion, and political resentment.”).
184. Klimkowsky & Lanoff, supra note 181, at 90 (blaming problems
with enforcing the statute on Congress for setting an “impossible task” of
joint administration for the DOL and IRS).
185. Id. at 91.
As ERISA was written, DOL and the IRS shared
responsibilities jointly, as opposed to having divided
responsibilities,
necessitating
intensive
coordination
between the two agencies if the law was to be implemented.
Because political compromise rather than ease of
administration dictated the administrative structure of
ERISA, severe management problems surfaced as soon as
managers attempted to implement the new law.
Id. at 94. But note the problems facing the idea of consolidation after ERISA’s
enactment (many of which helped doom the idea initially):
The structure and leadership of a new agency would be open
to much debate and possible disagreement which could kill
the idea entirely. It might not be possible to wrestle
pensions away from the IRS entirely, since the issue
remains very much a tax issue. Also, it is critical that
interest be aroused on the Hill before anything can be
accomplished. Few if any legislators have appeared to
accept the mantle of leadership from ERISA’s founding
fathers.
Klimkowsky, supra note 147, at 101.
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The current insufficient bureaucratic enforcement of
ERISA has left private litigation as the main enforcement
mechanism. Policy analyst Beverly Klimkowsky wrote on the
tenth anniversary of ERISA that “ERISA implementation has
not reached the mature stage of implementation in which the
administering agencies act as powerful players in the policy
process.”186 The same remains true today, and the courts have
picked up the policymaking mantle.
IV. Abdication or Delegation by the Judiciary After ERISA187
ERISA provides for civil action by both plan participants
and beneficiaries in addition to the Secretary of Labor. The
statute created a private right of action as follows:
A civil action may be brought—(1) by a
participant or beneficiary—. . . (B) to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan,
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan,
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under
the terms of the plan. . . . (3) by a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the
plan.188
When creating private litigation remedies, Congress is
aware that the courts may not always enforce the legislation as
expected or desired.189 “It is in the nature of statutory
186. Id. at 84 (noting that pension policy was largely being influenced by
groups that do not regard “the fulfillment of the promise for a private pension
as [their] sole or primary concern”).
187. See McCubbins, supra note 13, at 13 (discussing the delegation of
authority by Congress to the bureaucracy and its re-delegation).
188. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
189. Work by political scientist Sean Farhang suggests that the presence
of divided government – a Republican president and majority-Democrat
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interpretation that the interpreter, whether judicial or
administrative, will frequently be called upon to make
policy.”190 In the absence of strong bureaucratic enforcement of
ERISA, however, the judiciary has become the central pension
policymaking institution in the United States. Many legal
scholars have argued that the courts have used this position in
ways not intended by “ERISA’s language, legislative history, or
purposes.”191
When examining congressional delegation to bureaucratic
agents, political scientist Mathew McCubbins noted conditions
under which delegation fails and becomes abdication:
Principals may lack an effective check because
their agent has expertise that the principals do
not possess or because of conflicting interests
among the principals. Where delegation occurs
under such conditions, agents may be free to take
any action that suits them, regardless of the
consequences for the principles. Delegation then
becomes abdication.192
In the case of pension regulation, Congress delegated
authority over the administration of private pensions to
fiduciaries.193 The courts were supposed to supervise that
Congress – during the passage of ERISA likely influenced Congress’ decision
to enact a private litigation remedy. Farhang studies the decision by
Congress to develop private litigation remedies that effectively call on private
individuals to enforce the statute passed through the courts. Over 90% of
litigation enforcing statutes with private rights of action is litigated by a
diverse group of individuals acting in their own interests but also carrying
out a larger public service by enforcing the statute for all those affected. Sean
Farhang, Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation
of Powers System, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 821, 821-23 (2008).
190. Id. at 825 (internal citations omitted). See DONALD L. HOROWITZ,
THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 7 (1977) (“The individual litigant, though still
necessary, has tended to fade a bit into the background. Courts sometimes
take off from the individual cases before them to the more general problem
the cases call up, and indeed they may assume—dubiously—that the litigants
before them typify the problem.”).
191. Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits under ERISA, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
4 (1992).
192. McCubbins, supra note 13, at 37.
193. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 649.
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delegation through the private right of action, but they both
lack the expertise necessary to control fiduciary administration
and have conflicting interests in judicial efficiency.194 The
result is judicial abdication in the enforcement of ERISA’s
mission to safeguard benefit promises made to workers.
The “‘vast majority of ERISA cases are simple benefit
claim disputes in which a federal judge is reviewing the
decision of a plan fiduciary.’”195 Under ERISA, making
determinations of a participant or beneficiary’s benefits is a
fiduciary function because “a person is a fiduciary with respect
to the plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary
authority or discretionary control respecting management of
such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of its assets.”196 The courts are
authorized to review such determinations because ERISA
provides that a participant or beneficiary may sue “to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan.”197 Most pension
participants or beneficiaries therefore seek the assistance of
the courts to resolve benefit claims and are mainly concerned
about fiduciary decisions that deny them all or part of the
benefits to which they believe they are entitled. Because of this
point, I will focus on how the courts have abdicated their role to
supervise fiduciaries in deciding benefit claims, although the
same can be said of many other ERISA claims decided by the
courts.198
While Congress intended for the courts to fill gaps in the
statute and create common law to implement ERISA, many
legal scholars argue that federal common law regarding ERISA
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. ERISA § 3(21)(A)(iii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii).
197. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
198. Law Professor Jay Conison notes the importance of ERISA benefit
claims and calls them the “bottom-line” of ERISA. In his view, benefit claims
are first in ERISA’s hierarchy because “[u]nder ERISA, there is nothing else
to protect.” Vesting, accrual, and funding standards, as well as remedial
provisions for fiduciary breaches are all designed solely to ensure that
participants and beneficiaries receive the benefits to which they are entitled.
Conison, supra note 191, at 32-33.

41

2014]

A FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

257

benefit claims directly contradicts congressional intent.199
A. Conflating Delegation to Private Actors with Delegation to
Bureaucratic Actors
The analogy of private fiduciaries to agency bureaucrats by
federal courts reviewing the decisions of fiduciaries under
ERISA demonstrates the blurring of the line between
delegation to government officials and delegation to private
actors.200
In the landmark case of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, the Supreme Court ruled that the standard of review for
courts reviewing an ERISA fiduciary’s administrative decision
is de novo, meaning that the court should review all evidence
without giving any deference to the fiduciary’s decision. 201
However, the Court then created an enormous legal loophole
that ERISA fiduciaries drove right through by holding that if
the plan documents reserved the fiduciary’s right to exercise its
discretion to determine benefit claims, then the fiduciary’s
decision would be reviewed under the deferential “arbitrary
and capricious” standard.202 This standard provides that unless
the fiduciary’s decision was clearly arbitrary and capricious,
then the court cannot overturn the original decision—even if
the judge believes that another decision is proper. Bruch
permits the exception to eat the rule since nearly all plans now
contain reservations of rights that lead to the more lax
standard of review. This arbitrary and capricious standard
grants the same deference to ERISA fiduciaries as to decisionmakers in executive agencies.203
199. See id. at 7. Conison also discusses legislative history that suggests
Congress preempted state law on benefit claims as too restrictive because
state courts “‘strictly interpret the plan indenture and are reluctant to apply
concepts of equitable relief or to disregard technical document wording.’” Id.
at 16.
200. See John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The
Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials under
ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1331-33 (2007), for a discussion of this
analogy and a review of key cases.
201. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 101 (1989).
202. Id. at 109.
203. Discussing the cases prior to Bruch that mandated an arbitrary and
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Some courts have compared ERISA fiduciaries to executive
branch administrators without fully acknowledging the
implications of such an analogy. Judge Easterbrook from the
Seventh Circuit, for example, compared administrators at a
company that manages a large portion of disability benefit
plans covered by ERISA (which applies to most disability and
health benefit plans in addition to pension plans) to
administrative law judges at the Social Security
Administration who determine eligibility for Social Security
disability benefits.204 In considering whether to apply the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review to UNUM Life
Insurance Company in light of its interest in keeping costs
down, the court noted that each benefit claim has little impact
on a large company’s balance sheet, its employees do not
necessarily share its self-interest, and its clients want to
maintain good relationships with their employees and would
not want benefit claims summarily denied.205 Adding to these
factors that UNUM passes along the costs of benefit claims to
employers (though imperfectly) through experience rating (i.e.,
increased employer costs to reimburse third parties
administering benefit plans for retrospective benefit
payments), the court concluded, “Thus we have no reason to
capricious standard of review, Conison writes that “courts in ERISA cases
appreciated the irony of applying an approach whose main effect was to
facilitate defeat of benefit expectations. Because the approach was perceived
as well established, however, courts were reluctant to make any substantial
changes.” Conison, supra note 191, at 48. He then systematically undermines
the Court’s attempt to justify deferential review through assumptions that
benefit claims are a form of judicial review and that trust law governs such
claims. Id. at 51-60. The focus, he argues, should instead be on whether
benefit claims are decided correctly. Id.; see also Donald T. Bogan, ERISA:
The Foundational Insufficiencies for Deferential Review in Employee Benefit
Claims – Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 147, 197 (2009) (arguing that contract law and not trust law should
govern ERISA benefit claims, making summary deferential judicial
proceedings inappropriate).
204. See Perlman v. Swiss Bank Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan,
195 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e have held that courts may treat
welfare benefit plans just like administrative law judges implementing the
Social Security disability-benefits program.”) (citations omitted); Langbein,
supra note 200, at 1330-33.
205. See Perlman, 195 F.3d at 981 (“We have no reason to think that
UNUM’s benefits staff is any more ‘partial’ against applicants than are
federal judges deciding income-tax cases.”).
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think that the actual decisionmakers [sic] at UNUM
approached their task any differently than do the decisionmakers at the Social Security Administration, and ordinarily
deferential review is the order of the day.”206
As Judge Wood noted in her dissent, however, the analogy
between decision-making by ERISA fiduciaries and that of the
Social Security Administration is improper because of a lack of
safeguards to protect those whose benefits are in question.207
She argued:
Most importantly, the SSA is a public agency,
whose decisions are subject to the strictures of
the Administrative Procedure Act, while ERISA
plan administrators are private sector actors
subject to regulation under the ERISA statute. A
host of federal constitutional rights and statutory
rights combine to assure procedural regularity in
the case of public agencies that are not available
to those who attack private action.208

206. Id.; see Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir.
1985):
While the [arbitrary and capricious] standard is perhaps
more commonly associated with appellate court review of
administrative findings, deference is likewise due when a
district court reviews the action of a private plan trustee.
Here, as in other contexts, the standard exists to ensure
that administrative responsibility rests with those whose
experience is daily and continual, not with judges whose
exposure is episodic and occasional.
Id. For an argument that Judge Easterbrook inappropriately combines
“rulemaking” and “administrative adjudication” under a category of judicial
deference to agencies that he terms “delegation,” see Daniel T. Bogan, Reply
to Judge Easterbrook: The Unsupported Delegation of Conflict Adjudication
in ERISA Benefit Claims under the Guise of Judicial Deference, 57 OKLA. L.
REV. 21 (2004). Bogan argues that because Congress did not delegate the
adjudicative function under ERISA to any executive agency, the function
belongs with the federal courts and not private fiduciaries. Id. at 23-28.
207. See Perlman, 195 F.3d at 985 (7th Cir. 1999) (Wood, J., dissenting).
208. Id.
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The absence of these procedural safeguards for ERISA
fiduciaries deciding benefit claims makes the analogy of ERISA
fiduciaries to agency decision-makers inappropriate.209
ERISA’s required claims procedures, discussed further
below, are insufficient in several ways when compared with the
procedural safeguards available under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) and to Social Security claimants, for
example. Within the Social Security Administration, an
Administrative Law Judge presides over an administrative
trial where the claimant can present evidence and subpoena
and cross-examine witnesses. When federal courts hear an
appeal, the claimant has already had an opportunity to be
heard in the trial.210 Yet courts use the same arbitrary and
capricious standard to review ERISA benefit claims even
though participants have not been heard by a neutral decisionmaker, been permitted discovery or been able to cross-examine
witnesses at trial.211
Nor do ERISA fiduciaries necessarily have the expertise
that agency administrators possess to justify greater
deference.212 Fiduciaries, particularly executives of the
employer appointed to help administer the plans and contain
costs, frequently lack basic ERISA knowledge or legal or
accounting training to prepare them for their duties.213 They
may have no knowledge of legal rules of evidence or other
procedures to make sure they have investigated benefit claims

209. Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“The Social Security Administration is a public agency that denies benefits
only after giving the applicant an opportunity for a full adjudicative hearing
before a judicial officer, the administrative law judge. The procedural
safeguards thus accorded, designed to assure a full and fair hearing, are
missing from determinations by plan administrators.”); Mark D. DeBofsky,
The Paradox of the Misuse of Administrative Law in ERISA Benefit Claims,
37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 727, 738-43 (2004); Langbein, supra note 200, at
1332-33.
210. Bogan, supra note 206, at 26-27.
211. Id. at 28; DeBofsky, supra note 209, at 738-39 (“Although the
ERISA claim regulations provide many of these guarantees, the most crucial
protections are denied ERISA claimants. . . . Such claims are not presented to
an unbiased tribunal; and claimants lack any opportunity to challenge
adverse evidence through cross-examination.”).
212. Bogan, supra note 206, at 26-27.
213. Id. at 26.
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sufficiently.214
Under the APA, agency decisions made without the
hallmarks of substantive or procedural due process are subject
to de novo review by courts.215 Yet decisions by ERISA
fiduciaries that lack such safeguards receive the same
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review.216
Other federal courts have also cautioned against the
analogy between ERISA fiduciaries and executive agencies
because of the conflict of interest that fiduciaries face between
acting for the exclusive benefit of participants and to preserve
the assets of employers funding pension plans or third parties
insuring ERISA welfare plans. In Bruch, the Court
acknowledged that “if a benefit plan gives discretion to an
administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of
interest, that conflict must be weighed as a “‘facto[r] in
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.’”217 Courts
have been unsure how exactly conflicts should alter their
review of benefit claims, and in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
v. Glenn, the Supreme Court did not clarify its answer
substantially.218 Instead, the Court reiterated that the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of review applies when an
employer or insurer decides benefit eligibility and also pays
approved claims out of its own pocket.219 As a circuit court
wrote regarding the problem of applying administrative law in
the ERISA context:

214. Id.
215. DeBofsky, supra note 209, at 738-40.
216. Id.
217. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
187, cmt. d (1959)).
218. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 117 (2008)
(confirming that courts need to weigh different factors when reviewing
benefit claims, and conflict of interest is only one, although it carries more
weight “where circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that it affected the
benefits decision” and less weight “where the administrator has taken active
steps to reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy”); see Kathryn J.
Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM.
U. L. REV. 1083 (2001); LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 665-669.
219. Glenn, 554 U.S. at 108, 122.
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Use of the administrative agency analogy may,
ironically, give too much deference to ERISA
fiduciaries. Decisions in the ERISA context
involve the interpretation of contractual
entitlements; they ‘are not discretionary in the
sense, familiar from administrative law, of
decisions that make policy under a broad grant of
delegated powers.’ Moreover, the individuals who
occupy the position of ERISA fiduciaries are less
well-insulated from outside pressures than are
decision-makers at government agencies.220
This conflict of interest that occurs when an employer or
insurer decides benefit eligibility and also pays approved
claims out of its own pocket is one not typically faced by
decision-makers at executive agencies.221
Because of the lack of procedural safeguards and the
conflicted nature of ERISA fiduciaries, the fiduciaries are
supposed to be mere “interpreters of contractual
entitlements.”222 Continuing to treat fiduciaries as bureaucrats,
courts have instead required that participants and
beneficiaries first pursue their claims through the ERISA
plan’s internal grievance procedures (referred to as the

220. Brown, 898 F.2d at 1564 n. 7 (internal citations omitted).
221. To take a classic ERISA example, when an employer sponsors a
defined benefit pension plan, the employer assumes the risk of paying a
stated amount to workers and their beneficiaries in the future. If, for
example, the stock market underperforms and the money set aside by the
employer is insufficient to pay the required pension, the employer will need
to contribute more money. If, on the other hand, the employer can find a way
to deny a claim for pension benefits, then the employer will not have to
contribute as much to the pension plan. Benefit claims therefore directly
affect the employer’s finances, and because high-level employees or third
parties hired by the employer administer pension plans and owe their
employment to the plan sponsor, the employees and third parties have a
conflict of interest when deciding benefit claims. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra
note 26, at 652-53 (noting that “because ERISA § 408(c)(3) allows
management officers to serve as plan fiduciaries, ERISA all but invites
conflicts of interest in plan administration”).
222. Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Emps. Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1050
(7th Cir. 1987) (noting that ERISA sought to limit freedom of contract to
protect pension participants, and they deserve a fair judicial hearing to
determine their rights).
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exhaustion requirement) prior to seeking review in the federal
courts.223
Section 503 of ERISA provides:
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary,
every employee benefit plan shall—(1) provide
adequate notice in writing to any participant or
beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the
plan has been denied, setting forth the specific
reasons for such denial, written in a manner
calculated to be understood by the participant,
and (2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any
participant whose claim for benefits has been
denied for a full and fair review by the
appropriate named fiduciary of the decision
denying the claim.224
The text above does not require that a claimant exhaust
the plan’s review process prior to seeking review of the benefit
determination in the courts. 225 Yet courts have held exhaustion
of a plan’s internal administrative remedies to be mandatory
with very limited exceptions.226 In effect, the courts have
required that claimants petition the very administrator(s) who
initially rejected their claims prior to seeking any assistance
from the courts.227
Courts have relied on ERISA’s text and legislative history
to justify requiring exhaustion of internal remedies prior to
seeking recourse in the courts.228 In ERISA’s requirement that
benefit plans have internal claims procedures for participants
who want to petition the plan to review its decision to deny
benefits, the courts have found that Congress intended the
procedures to be used for all benefits claims.229 Courts relied on
223. Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980).
224. ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133.
225. DeBofsky, supra note 209, at 732.
226. Id.; Conison, supra note 191, at 21-22; LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note
26, at 754-56.
227. Amato, 618 F.2d at 569.
228. Id. at 566.
229. Id. at 567 (“It would certainly be anomalous if the same good
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Congress’ supposed concern with efficient resolution of ERISA
claims—favoring efficiency over correcting flawed decisions.230
According to one district court, it is in the best interests of both
employers and employees that costs of administering benefit
claims be minimized:
If claimants were allowed to litigate the validity
of their claims before a final trustee decision was
rendered, the costs of dispute settlement would
increase markedly for employers. Employees
would also suffer financially because, rather than
utilize a simple procedure which allows them to
deal directly with their employer, they would
have to employ an attorney and bear the costs of
adversary litigation in the courts.231
The courts even justified the exhaustion requirement as a
burden that Congress had placed on fiduciaries to review their
actions and efficiently enforce the plan’s provisions.232 In Maker

reasons that presumably led Congress and the Secretary to require covered
plans to provide administrative remedies for aggrieved claimants did not lead
the courts to see that those remedies are regularly used.”).
230. Makar v. Health Care Corp. of Mid-Atlantic, 872 F.2d 80, 83 (4th
Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted) (“Congress’ apparent intent in
mandating these internal claims procedures was to minimize the number of
frivolous ERISA lawsuits; promote the consistent treatment of benefit claims;
provide a nonadversarial dispute resolution process; and decrease the cost
and time of claims settlement.” (emphasis added)); Taylor v. Bakery &
Confectionary Workers Union & Indus. Int’l Welfare Fund, 455 F. Supp. 816,
820 (E.D.N.C. 1978) (internal citations omitted) (“Tied to these inter-fund
claims procedures was Congress’ awareness of the potential costs of pension
reform, and it sought to ‘strike a balance between providing meaningful
reform and keeping costs within reasonable limits.’ Congress was particularly
concerned with outlining a private insurance system that would operate
efficiently, thereby increasing its acceptance and institution among American
business.”).
231. Taylor, 455 F. Supp. at 820.
232. Makar, 872 F.2d at 83 (internal citations omitted) (“By preventing
premature interference with an employee benefit plan’s remedial provisions,
the exhaustion requirement enables plan fiduciaries to efficiently manage
their funds; correct their errors; interpret plan provisions; and assemble a
factual record which will assist a court in reviewing the fiduciaries’ actions.”);
Denton v. First Nat’l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1303 n.13 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“Another important facet of the exhaustion requirement is that it prevents
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v. Health Care Corporation of Mid-Atlantic, the court states
that “[i]n short, Congress intended plan fiduciaries, not the
federal courts, to have primary responsibility for claims
processing.”233
Contrary to the rule adopted by the courts, the legislative
history indicates that Congress required claims procedures
merely to provide another avenue to address participant
grievances.234 The House labor bill did not require an internal
claims review procedure.235 While the Senate labor bill did
include a version of ERISA Section 503, the bill that went to
the conference committee instead provided for voluntary
arbitration.236 The main concern was protecting participants
and giving them easy, cheap ways to recover their benefits.237
As Senator Williams stated, a participant or beneficiary “would
have the right” to know why his or her claims was denied and
“would be entitled to a full and fair review.”238 This language
focuses on the participant or beneficiary’s rights – not the
employer’s rights. The adoption of an exhaustion requirement
actually represented a step backwards from state law preERISA.239
Congress unquestionably intended courts to
develop some set of rules to govern actions for
benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B). But the rules

fiduciaries from avoiding their duties under the Plan by insulating all benefit
decisions in the protective mantel of federal judicial review. If fiduciaries were
to find their decisions more closely supervised by an intervening federal
judiciary, it is likely that they would go to court to seek instruction by
declaratory relief on questions involving claims for benefits, rather than
deciding those questions themselves as Congress intended.”) ; Amato, 618 F.2d
at 567 (“[I]mplementation of the exhaustion requirement will enhance their
ability to expertly and efficiently manage their funds by preventing
premature judicial intervention in their decision-making processes.”).
233. Makar, 872 F.2d at 83 (4th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted).
234. Conison, supra note 191, at 24.
235. Id. at 22.
236. Id. at 22-23.
237. Id. at 24.
238. Id. at 25.
239. Id. (“Thus, the legislative history provides no support for the view
that a suit for benefits was intended to be the second, appellate stage of a
process beginning with the plan claims procedures.”).
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developed must be consistent with the purposes
of ERISA. The current law pays little attention
to ERISA’s central purpose of safeguarding
benefit expectations. Indeed, it often seems
perversely
designed
to
thwart
benefit
expectations, for no better reason than judicial
force of habit.240
While Frank Cummings worried about the dollar amounts
of pension claims being too small to motivate lawyers to take
the cases as necessary to pursue a participant’s rights, perhaps
he should instead have worried about whether the courts would
be willing to review pension cases. As Law Professor Jay
Conison argues, “the main policy argument advanced for
deference has been that it reduces judicial caseload,” but this
was not the concern of ERISA.241 Courts are hostile to benefit
claims because they are fact-intensive and usually involve
small value claims, even though there is no evidence that a less
deferential standard of review would overwhelm court
dockets.242 Regardless, Congress mandated that courts decide
benefit claims, and the judicial thwarting of its role has
allowed governmental control over retirement security to flow
unhindered to the private sector.243
B. Bring on the “Death Panels”
The furor over the myth that new healthcare legislation
would ration healthcare and engage in a form of euthanasia
attracted great attention and caused a provision reimbursing
for end-of-life discussions between doctors and patients to be
removed prior to passage of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).244 A draft of the legislation
included under the heading “Advanced Care Planning

240. Conison, supra note 191, at 3.
241. Id. at 61.
242. See id. (“[T]he control argument is speculative.”).
243. See id.
244. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th
CONG. (2009).
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Consultation” authorized Medicare reimbursement for doctors
who counseled patients on end-of-life issues ranging from
palliative care to living wills, health proxies, and powers of
attorney. 245 When politicians and pundits on the right became
involved, however, the provision took on a very different
meaning. Sarah Palin’s inflammatory Facebook posting is
illustrative:
The America I know and love is not one in which
my parents or my baby with Down Syndrome
will have to stand in front of Obama’s ‘death
panel’ so his bureaucrats can decide, based on a
subjective judgment of their ‘level of productivity
in society,’ whether they are worthy of health
care. Such a system is downright evil.246
Called the “Lie of the Year” by the website PolitiFact, Palin’s
comment was merely one example of the rhetoric on the right
“mischaracterize[ing] as bureaucratic ‘death panels’” such endof-life consultations.247
More outrage erupted when economist and New York
Times contributor Paul Krugman announced that the solution
to the budget deficit “will and should rely on both ‘death panels
and sales taxes.’”248 His point was that healthcare cost
containment is necessary and inevitable and that a cost-benefit

245. Id. at § 1233.
246. Paul Westfall, Ethically Economic: The Affordable Care Act’s
Impact on the Administration of Health Benefits, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 99, 109-10 (2011) (quoting Palin’s well-known Facebook posting); see
Joshua E. Perry, A Missed Opportunity: Health Care Reform, Rhetoric, Ethics
and Economics at the End of Life, 29 MISS. C. L. REV. 409, 411-12 (2010).
247. Perry, supra note 246, at 412 (citing comments on Fred Thompson’s
July 16, 2009 radio show that the provision “‘would make it mandatory—
absolutely require—that every five years people in Medicare [would be
required to have a] counseling session that will tell them how to end their life
sooner’” and by Republican House Leader John Boehner that it “‘may start us
down a treacherous path toward government-encouraged euthanasia if
enacted into law’”).
248. Paul Krugman, Death Panels and Sales Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.14,
2010, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/death-panels-and-salestaxes/?_r=0.
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analysis for all medical treatments will be necessary.249 The
nation’s healthcare system must ration healthcare to be
financially sustainable. The less well-known and discussed
reality is that ERISA fiduciaries ration healthcare every day
with little review of their decisions by courts as a result of the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review.250
While the legislative history of ERISA focuses on pension
reform, ERISA dramatically altered healthcare in the United
States with few outside the industry aware of the changes.
ERISA did not impose detailed rules for the provision of health
benefits by employers other than reporting and disclosure
requirements and fiduciary protections.251 Yet the courts’ use of
the arbitrary and capricious standard to review benefit claims
applied to health plans as well, and ERISA’s broad preemption
clause effectively allowed employers and health insurance
companies to opt in to the generous deference provided by
courts to ERISA-covered benefit plans through selfinsurance.252
ERISA’s preemption clause allowed employers to avoid
state regulation of healthcare and deny benefits to an
increasing number of participants.253 The clause mandates that
ERISA “supercede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” with
an exception for any law that “regulates insurance, banking, or
securities.”254 The “deemer clause” then prevents the
application of these state insurance, banking, and securities
laws to employee benefit plans. In the case of health plans, the
“deemer clause”255 provides that an employee benefit plan will
not be “deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer . .

249. See id.
250. See David Goldin, Survey, External Review Process Options for SelfFunded Health Insurance Plans, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429 (2011)
(addressing opportunities to provide less deference to the decisions of selffunded health insurance plan administrators than the courts currently
require under ERISA through the ACA’s requirement that insurance
companies develop an external review process).
251. WOOTEN, supra note 84, at 281.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), (b)(2)(A).
255. WOOTEN, supra note 84, at 281.
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. or to be engaged in the business of insurance” for the purpose
of state insurance laws.256
To take advantage of the pre-emption of state laws and the
favorable standard of review for benefit claims, particularly
when healthcare costs started to skyrocket in the 1980s, many
additional employers began to self-insure.257 Although at the
time of ERISA large health plans had begun to self-insure, the
trend now included many smaller plans.258 The development of
utilization review brought employers administering health
plans and their third party administrators (often insurance
companies) into diagnostic decisions.259 The plans now
frequently had to approve healthcare decisions before the
services could be provided—in effect deciding what type of care
an employee or relative could receive.260
Self-insurance benefited employers with little risk of
significant liability.261 Employers purchased “stop-loss” policies
to prevent unanticipated liability if benefit payments exceeded
estimated costs.262 Additionally, employers increasingly denied
benefit claims through utilization review, while plan
participants faced an uphill battle appealing denials in court.263
At worst, the plan would have to pay the claim and attorneys’
fees after a lawsuit because courts also interpreted ERISA’s
remedies narrowly.264 Scandals over bad faith denials of benefit
claims were exposed slowly and called into question the
involvement of ERISA fiduciaries in healthcare decisions.265
Courts downplayed the conflict of interest faced by these
fiduciaries deciding benefit claims.266 They argued that “small”
benefit claims did not make an administrator at a company
256. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
257. WOOTEN, supra note 84, at 281.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 282-83.
260. Id. at 283.
261. Id. at 281-82.
262. Id. at 282.
263. WOOTEN, supra note 84, at 283.
264. Id.
265. See Langbein, supra note 200 at 1317-21 (discussing scandal over
the Unum/Provident Corporation’s long-term policy of denying valid
disability benefit claims to increase profits).
266. Id. at 1327.
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with billions of dollars in annual revenue conflicted.267 Yet the
pattern of denial of small benefit claims added up to significant
additional revenue.268 Courts also found comfort in employers’
reputational concerns, arguing that if their health plans
unfairly denied benefit claims, employees would go
elsewhere.269 Given the opaque process of deciding benefit
claims, however, employees had little chance to compare
employers based on their administration of health plans.270
Employers and third party administrators also had significant
financial incentives to deny claims that overrode reputational
concerns.271 Finally, courts argued that benefit costs were
passed on to employers through experience rating later.272 In
the competitive insurance market, insurance companies needed
to absorb much of the unexpected costs, though.273
Given their outrage over the idea of the government
rationing healthcare, Americans obviously do not understand
the extent to which employers and insurance companies
already ration healthcare to contain costs. While there is hope
that the ACA’s provisions requiring external review will
provide an opportunity to increase the fairness of decisions by
administrators of health plans,274 the political pressure applied
by employers and insurance companies to contain costs and
increase profits will be difficult to resist.
The idea of rationing healthcare by denying benefit claims
attracted significant attention, but the crisis caused by denying
pension benefit claims attracts little attention. Perhaps the
decline in defined benefit pensions has ameliorated the effects
of these benefit denials. Or maybe the economic recession made
salary the primary concern of the workforce. Employees also
notoriously discount the value of pension benefits when they
are younger. Regardless, the debate over rationing healthcare
may be the foot in the door necessary to change the arbitrary

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id.
Id. at 1327-28.
Id. at 1328-29.
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1330-31.
Id. at 1331.
See Goldin, supra note 250.
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and capricious standard currently being used by courts to
review ERISA benefit claims.
As the ACA begins the process of revamping our
healthcare system, the question of who should ration access to
traditional employee benefits such as healthcare and private
pensions needs to be addressed. If employers and insurance
companies retain control over healthcare decisions, then there
is no chance to better protect pension promises. If, however, the
external review process for health claims provides for review by
a neutral party or simply eliminates the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review for health plans, pension claims
should not be left behind.
V. Conclusion
The United States is not the only country whose judiciary
has failed to adequately protect pension beneficiaries when
available tools made it possible. Law Professor Elizabeth
Shilton declared, “[f]or employee pension rights [in Canada],
the promise of trust law has proved to be a false one.”275
Recognizing that courts “share a responsibility with
legislatures for distributive outcomes within employment
pension plans,” Shilton takes issue with the abdication of
Canadian courts in their role as protectors of employee pension
rights.276 In the end, Shilton finds that the need to facilitate
voluntary pensions overcomes the moral aspect of the fiduciary
duties inherent in trust law.277 “If employers can over-ride the
most ‘fundamental’ characteristics of a trust simply by
inserting explicit wording, then it is employers, rather than the
courts, who will ultimately define the scope and content of
trust commitments.”278
Refusing to absolve judges of their responsibility for the
turn that pension law has taken in Canada, Shilton notes,
“[t]he analysis of the case law in this paper has identified

275. Elizabeth Shilton, Employee Pension Rights and the False Promise
of Trust Law, 34 DALHOUSIE L.J. 81, 83 (2011).
276. Id. at 84.
277. Id. at 113.
278. Id. at 98-99.
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numerous analytic nodes where courts applying the common
law have made choices—choices not dictated by ‘the law,’ but
by predispositions and values, and the weighing of those policy
factors they identify as relevant and important.”279 While
acknowledging the need for additional legislation to safeguard
employee pension rights and the hesitancy of the legislature to
act on this sensitive issue, Shilton sees an important role for
the courts in shifting the common law and finding a stronger
role for fiduciary protections.280
Similarly, I argue here that the failure to create a single,
expert bureaucratic agency to supervise Congress’ delegation of
authority to private fiduciaries has left the courts as the only
government institution capable of properly supervising
fiduciaries and finally creating a coherent body of pension
policy that focuses on protecting workers’ expectations. The
courts have made choices, as Shilton says, and these choices
were not mandated by ERISA but instead based on factors
important to the judges and fear of involvement in this
unwieldy statute. It is time for the courts to reexamine
ERISA’s legislative history and focus on its underlying goals.
Congress did not mandate a highly deferential standard of
review for benefit claims or a restriction on the types of
evidence that courts will hear; the courts did. The courts,
therefore, can find a way to better enforce pension promises.

279. Id. at 113.
280. Id. at 114.
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